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INTRODUCTION 
How accurate does Charles Dickens’ depiction of 
18th century Europe remain: “It was the best of 
times, it was the worst of times.” The human toll 
of the COVID-19 virus is of course abundantly 
clear to everyone, while the economic fallout is 
now hitting workers and consumers all around 
the world. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) expects a blow to the EU economy of 
more than seven percent in 2020.1 Much of the 
policy focus has therefore been directed toward 
mitigating the direct impacts of the virus on, for 
example, temporary unemployment, and toward 
the short-term recovery once lockdown measures 
are (partially) lifted. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has rightfully been 
depicted this as the “worst global crisis since 
World War II”. It is of course first and foremost 
a tragic health issue that has affected the whole 
world, with already hundreds of thousands of 
deaths in May 2020. Consequently, policymakers 
must have the audacity to think about what the 
world could and should look like after this, so as 
not to return to “business as usual”. 
What better aspect of society to examine such 
prospects than the global fight against climate 
change—or what was once, before the pandemic, 
considered the “defining issue of our time”? 
Business-as-usual means going back to a scenario 
in which we are heading toward warming of more 
than 3°C by the end of this century, over 3.6 
million yearly deaths worldwide due to fossil fuel-
related air pollution, as well as armed conflict, 
economic underdevelopment and democratic 
regression because of dependency on fossil fuel 
resources. If indeed the recovery would entail 
drafting a new kind of society, then surely, 
tackling climate change will at the top of the 
agenda when contemplating long-term recovery 
strategies. 
Analysing the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact 
on the climate-energy nexus, raises three 
important questions. First, what does this 
global health and economic crisis mean for 
the future of fossil fuels, particularly oil? 
Because of the drop in economic activity, 
greenhouse gas emissions have plummeted, 
but how can we ensure a structural decline 
that is aligned with the Paris Agreement? 
Third, how can we embed the ideas of a “just 
transition” within the broader post-
pandemic “green recovery”? This policy 
brief offers a glimpse of the direction away 
from fossil fuels that our global energy 
system must take to govern the post-
pandemic world 
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The pandemic has already (in)directly impacted 
many aspects of what can be conveniently called 
the climate-energy nexus—or the environmental, 
social, economic, technological and political 
relationship between energy systems and the 
climate. According to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) due to a historic drop in energy 
demand, CO2 emissions are expected to decline 
by eight percent this year.2 During a simultaneous 
supply a demand shock, oil prices tumbled to a 
historic low—with WTI oil3 for a short period 
trading at negative prices. And many countries 
have now asserted that we should focus on a 
green or climate-friendly recovery. In the case of 
the EU this would entail prioritising the Green 
Deal. 
Following these developments, three policy-
relevant questions stand out for those interested 
in the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
climate-energy nexus: 
1. Is the pandemic accelerating the end of the 
“fossil fuel era”? If yes, what does this crisis mean 
for the future of fossil fuels, and oil in particular? 
2. How can we ensure a structural drop in CO2 
emissions now that our fossil fuel dependence is 
increasingly questioned amid the health and 
climate crises? 
3. How can we embed ideas associated with a 
“just (energy) transition” within the broader 
strategy of “green recovery”? 
I attempt to formulate some answers and 
highlight potential ways forward to ensure both a 
just and green recovery. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR THE 
FOSSIL FUEL ERA ? 
Fossil fuels—oil in particular—have long been 
considered the lifeblood of our society. But the 
tide may be turning and COVID-19 could herald 
a change in fortune for the industry. The focus in 
this brief is on oil, because of its particular 
importance for the world economy (much more 
than coal and natural gas) and the unexpected 
consequences that the pandemic have caused for 
oil specifically. 
2020 has been quite the ride so far. On the supply 
side, an oil price war resulted from a spat between 
Saudi Arabia, the dominant force within the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), and Russia. Amid dwindling 
oil prices, in the beginning of March, Saudi 
Arabia sought to reach an oil output agreement 
with Russia and OPEC+.4 But Russia opposed, 
most probably because it was trying to win a 
bigger slice of a shrinking market. In response, 
Saudi Arabia raked up its production levels to 
historic highs, resulting in the biggest one-day 
drop in oil prices since the 1991 Gulf War. 
In order to halt the world’s oil industry spiral out 
of control toward rock-bottom prices, especially 
the American president was eager to strike a deal. 
The United States’ position of largest oil 
producer in the world and its president’s 
ambition of establishing “energy dominance” 
were at stake. The shale industry, driver of the 
United States’ recent production boom, has a far 
higher breakeven price and is more debt-laden 
than national oil companies in Russia and Saudi-
Arabia. So with persistently low oil prices, their 
very existence was at stake. On Sunday 12 April, 
OPEC+, with support from the G20 and the 
United States, agreed to cut a historic 9.7 mb/d 
of production—or close to 10 percent of global 
pre-crisis demand. This was supposed to calm 
international markets. 
But the price stabilisation, predicated on more-
or-less stable demand, did not substantiate. Far 
from that, actually. The pandemic wiped out 
almost a third of global oil demand because of 
lockdowns and travel bans. So in the past 
months, oil fields have been shut down, storage 
tanks have filled up rapidly and WTI oil prices 
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even turned negative for a while because of 
oversupply and lower demand.5 
For the industry, this pandemic comes on top of 
another crisis: climate change. As climate change 
has been at the top of political agendas for a while 
now, oil demand is likely to peak much earlier 
than expected. Some even suggest that demand 
may have already peaked. One of America’s most 
well-known stock exchange analysts, Jim Cramer, 
late-January announced that oil stocks are in their 
“death knell phase”. He compared oil fossil fuel 
stocks to the normative stigma that is attached to 
investing in tobacco companies. 
But the distaste for oil stocks and investments 
does not only come from moral activists. 
Financial storm clouds had been gathering above 
the fossil fuel industry for a while. Already back 
in February, the CEO of the energy supermajor 
Shell, Ben van Buerden, remarked that “all 
economic indicators are against us.” The energy 
sector’s weight in the S&P 500, the list of the 
United States’ largest publicly-traded companies, 
had dropped from almost 16 percent in 2008 to 
well under four percent at the beginning of 2020. 
Moreover, reporting suggests that ESG funds 
have vastly outperformed the wider global stock 
index since the COVID-19 crisis hit the markets 
by avoiding exposure to oil and other energy 
sectors. The renewables sector is forecast by the 
IEA to be the only part of the global energy 
system that will grow this year, with production 
and installation costs continuously falling.6 More 
evidence that highlights the appeal to investors of 
renewables over fossil fuels: The oil price crash in 
March has led Orsted (a Danish off-shore wind 
developer) to overtake the Norwegian oil major 
Equinor as the most valuable energy company in 
the Nordic countries. 
And what can we expect from “Big Oil” itself? 
Not too much it seems. Despite recent calls by 
some energy majors to reach net zero emissions 
across all its operations and production by mid-
century, their efforts are at best haphazard. A 
recent IEA report shows that in 2019, 99.2 
percent of oil and gas majors’ capital spending 
went to fossil fuels, and only 0.8 percent was 
directed to renewables and carbon capture and 
storage projects.7 One of the industry’s last straws 
to attract investors, its consistently high 
dividends, is now under threat as well due to 
falling oil prices. For the first time since World 
War II Shell is now cutting its dividend. 
This shows that the oil price crash and turmoil in 
global markets does not necessarily have to derail 
the clean energy transition. The oil industry is at 
a turning point, although it will not go down 
without a fight. Everywhere, the fossil fuel sector 
is quickly ramping up its formidable lobbying 
power to influence all types of regulations, from 
environmental protection to financial bailouts 
and subsidy increases. Moreover, climate change 
efforts risk being delayed because of cheap oil 
and a global recession that will get most political 
and financial attention. 
In any case, we are now witnessing a cautious 
change in the social licence of the oil industry. 
Not just among activists, but also among 
financial, economic and political decision-
makers. Combatting the sector is perhaps no 
longer only reserved for climate campaigners. In 
other words, Greta Thunberg and other climate 
strikers might soon find an unlikely ally in the 
financial sector. This would strengthen the appeal 
for further climate action as the world starts 
recovering from the COVID-19 crisis. As many 
decision-makers are now contemplating integrating 
aspects of a “green transition” into their recovery 
plans, a managed, yet rapid decline of fossil fuel 
production and consumption should be 
considered, while investments in renewables 
should be prioritised. 
ENSURING STRUCTURAL CO2 DECLINE  
The decline in oil demand and economic lockdowns 
all around the world quickly resulted in a reduction 
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of various types of environmental pollution, 
including greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such as 
CO2 and N2O, as well as aerosols, short-lived gases 
and harmful particulate matter. NO2 levels, 
associated with industrial and automotive 
combustion processes, also declined. In China alone, 
due to the lockdown measures CO2 emissions 
declined by 25 percent (or 200 MtCO2) lower in 
February. Data from the European Environmental 
Agency revealed that an immediate lockdown effect 
could also be observed here in the EU. Air pollution 
levels dropped spectacularly in cities such as Rome, 
Madrid, Milan and Barcelona. 
In the past couple of decades, only twice did a real 
yearly decrease in CO2 emissions occur; when the 
Soviet Union collapsed and after the global financial 
crisis hit in 2008-2009. During the latter crisis, the 
world witnessed a 1.4 percent decline in CO2 
emissions.8 As I mentioned, carbon emissions are 
expected to decline by eight percent this year, with 
the greatest absolute fall in emissions coming from 
the United States, the EU and China. Surely, this is 
the greatest drop ever, more than during any other 
crisis or war. 
But global emissions would need to fall consistently 
by 7.6 per cent each year between 2020 and 2030, 
according to the UN Environment Programme, in 
order to reach the 1.5°C warming objective 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement. By no means it is 
a given that the 2020 emissions drop is structural. On 
the contrary. Post-crisis emissions are highly 
dependent on the mode of recovery. After the 
financial crisis, emissions rose again by almost six 
percent in 2010. If low carbon development 
strategies and policies are not rolled out in the 
economic stimulus packages responding to the 
COVID-19 pandemic recovery, emissions will 
recover and even overshoot previously projected 
levels by 2030.9 
EU institutions and member states have already 
signalled their willingness to proceed with the Green 
Deal and they have reiterated calls to put “green 
transition” at the heart of recovery plans. Although 
political contestation to such plans are inevitable. 
Francesca Colli wrote an excellent piece outlining the 
effects of COVID-19 on the EU Green Deal in 
another Egmont policy brief. She describes three key 
difficulties with the Green Deal. First, a lack of 
public, media and political attention to the climate 
crisis due to the acute pandemic. Second, economic 
recession impeding (public) investments in green 
and climate-friendly sectors. Third, a loss of trust and 
solidarity among EU states.10 
How climate, clean energy and environmental 
considerations will be integrated in the economic 
recovery plans of course remains subject to 
ideological discussion. Some countries are trying to 
put a “green recovery” at the heart of their stimulus 
plans, while others at best seem hesitant. But 
behavioural change is much harder than rhetorical 
commitment. Researchers at Oxford University 
have found that G20 nations have already spent 7.3 
trillion USD on (fiscal) recovery measures. They 
estimate that only four percent of policies are ‘green’, 
with potential to reduce long-run emissions, four 
percent are ‘brown’ and likely to increase net 
emissions beyond the base case, and 92 percent are 
“colourless”, meaning that they maintain the status 
quo on course for over 3°C warming.11 
What is clear, however, is that governments—and 
therefore “the state”—are back. All eyes are on their 
intervention in safely guiding societies through this 
crisis. In this context, a strong state, with new-found 
confidence, could once again the lead in 
(inter)national climate action as well. Without merely 
seeing themselves as facilitators for “the market”. 
One way in which states can establish this, is by 
making public financial support “climate 
conditional”. In that case, airlines can receive public 
support only if they comply with certain demands, 
such as cancellation of short-haul flights, increase in 
cooperation with rail companies, heavier use of eco-
friendly fuels and bigger tax contributions. 
But to broaden the appeal to workers and consumers 
of a state-led green recovery, in which fossil fuels are 
gradually phased out, policymakers also have to take 
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into account issues around fairness, solidarity, and 
justice. 
RECONCILING THE GREEN RECOVERY AND 
A JUST TRANSITION  
Even if the focus is put on a “green recovery”, this 
does not mean that the recovery will be “just”. In 
terms of economic support mechanisms, the 
situation of workers in the gig or platform economy, 
who generally have with week, day or zero-hour 
contracts, stands out. Many of them are now 
unemployed. Since they are not under contract, they 
cannot claim temporary unemployment benefits. 
This is only one example of a justice question that 
will require a political solution in the weeks and 
months to come. 
One sector, where the “green recovery” and “just 
transition” meet, is aviation. One of the most hard-
hit sectors. The International Civil Aviation 
Association (ICAO) is expected losses to run up to 
USD 112-132 billion in the first half of 2020. It 
expects 503 to 607 million less passengers in the 
same period. All over the world, the sector is 
demanding government intervention through 
government bailouts. In Belgium there is an ongoing 
discussion about whether or not to nationalise 
Brussels Airlines. The Italian government took full 
control over Alitalia in March.  
But direct emissions from aviation also account for 
about 3 percent of the EU’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions and more than 2 percent of global 
emissions. If global aviation was a country, it would 
rank in the top 10 emitters. If government’s opt to 
bail out airlines, they should set strict climate 
conditions for a sector that was previously projected 
to increase its emissions by 300 percent by the year 
2050. This could potentially include demands to 
reduce or stop short-haul flights, increase 
cooperation with rail companies, heavier use of eco-
friendly fuels and bigger tax contributions. Austria is 
one country where this is added to bailout 
negotiations. 
Taxation is key to organising not only a green, but 
also a just and equitable transition. The aviation 
industry is notorious for its tax exemptions around 
the world. In the EU for example, airlines do not pay 
taxes on kerosene, while in almost no country do 
they pay VAT. Working conditions at airports and 
(low-cost) airlines are also sub-standard in many 
(EU) countries. Yet, in the UK, the billionaire owner 
of the airline company Virgin Atlantic, Richard 
Branson, has come under scrutiny for demanding a 
bailout. Branson has paid no personal income tax 
since moving to the tax free British Virgin Islands 14 
years ago. He lives and works on his own private 
island. 
It is crucial for governments, when considering 
bailouts, to include social issues into their climate 
conditional relief packages for airlines and airports. 
This includes, but should not be limited to, fair wages 
for baggage handlers, no increase in managerial 
renumerations or dividend pay-out during the crisis, 
aviation tax reform (on an EU level)12, and no 
bailouts for companies that are registered in tax 
havens. The latter is a Danish precedent that ought 
to be emulated throughout the EU. 
This discussion is to illustrate that national solidarity 
mechanisms and justice considerations will be crucial 
in tackling the pandemic. But just as with the climate 
crisis, it becomes clear that transnational justice 
ought to be a central pillar of recovery plans. In 
specific, the relationship between the Global North 
(or developed economies) and the Global South (or 
developing economies) is key here. 
COVID-19 actually could wreak most havoc in 
poor, developing countries. Very simplistically put, 
the seemingly easy measure of “social distancing” 
cannot be ensured everywhere. What if you live in an 
over-crowded slum or a Syrian refugee camp? What 
if recent disease outbreaks, such as Ebola in the 
DRC, are already putting an immense strain on a 
poorly developed health system? What if the vast 
majority of the workforce is employed in the 
informal economy and there are no social safety nets 
for these workers once a lockdown is announced? 
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What if a government spends more on external debt 
than it does on the public health system? 
Oxfam reports that between six and eight percent of 
the global population could be forced into poverty, 
setting back the fight against poverty by a decade, 
and as much as 30 years in some regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North 
Africa.13 So indeed, these questions require 
transnational solidarity and cooperation mechanisms.  
One way of doing so, is debt cancellation. Many 
developing are now facing a debt crisis, because of 
heavy lending on international financial markets in 
the recent past. Furthermore, these debts also reveal 
the structural injustices embedded in international 
finance flows, because they often include decades-
old repayments to former colonisers. 
External debt now impedes governments to invest 
in other critical services, such as the public health 
sector. Research shows that among the 121 low and 
middle-income countries for which 2019 data was 
available an average of 10.7 percent of government 
revenue was spent on public health systems, 
compared with 12.2 percent on external debt 
payments. Of the 121 countries examined, 64 were 
spending more on debt servicing than on public 
health. 14 
Cancelling a country’s debt payments in 2020 would, 
for instance, enable a government to give a cash 
grant or lump sum to its citizens in order to soften 
the financial blow of the COVID-19 crisis. The IMF 
and World Bank have issued a statement, urging 
bilateral creditors to suspend debt payments from 
the poorest countries so they can free up resources 
to combat the crisis. Concretely, the immediate 
suspension of developing countries’ debt for a year, 
and, where needed, complete cancellation thereof 
should be considered. Cancelling debt payments is 
the fastest way to keep money in countries and to 
free up resources to tackle the urgent health, social 
and economic crises resulting from the pandemic. 
This discussion shows how an acute global health 
crisis, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, 
simultaneously reveals structural injustices within 
and between countries all around the world. 
Moreover, given the similarities between the climate 
crisis and this pandemic, we can learn a lot from 
discussions about just transitions. Indeed, as the 
virus rages throughout societies everywhere, we are 
once again confronted with the fact that this is not 
the “great equaliser” and that we are not all victims. 
There are inequalities in which groups of the 
population, which countries are mostly affected. 
Clear policy choices, on national and international 
level, can help distribute more equally the costs of 
the health and financial crisis, and the benefits of the 
economic recovery measures. 
A WAY FORWARD 
The climate crisis and energy transition have been 
pushed to the back of the news because of COVID-
19. But as the world is grappling with what looks like 
to become the largest economic shock since the 
Great Depression, the “Great Lockdown” also 
appears to provide some opportunities, especially in 
light of a green and just transition. 
One key socio-economic and political development 
is that the state is once again at the heart of economic 
decision-making. This is pivotal for the four 
categories of policy recommendations that follow 
from this brief: 
A first is that recovery plans should kill two birds 
with one stone: economy and climate. Green 
economic stimulus package focused on low carbon 
energy system development and infrastructure will 
have a fundamental effect on reducing emissions 
during the recovery. They have been proven to be 
more economically resilient during this crisis and 
they are more beneficial overall to long-term 
economic development. 
Second, measures that put forward the managed 
decline of fossil fuels should be central to every green 
recovery plan. This includes no easing of 
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environmental regulations, a phase-out of fossil fuel 
subsidies, and no bailouts for fossil fuel-related 
companies. This of course excludes relief packages 
for workers become unemployment due to coal 
plant shutdowns for example, or the financing of 
retraining programmes for fossil fuel workers. 
Third, fair distribution of costs and benefits is the 
most important . On a national, or EU level, this 
includes holding companies accountable for tax 
avoidance, designing inclusive unemployment 
measures so all types of affected workers can be 
relieved, or demanding other financial contributions 
such as prohibitions on dividend pay-outs. 
Fourth, this also entails ensuring international 
solidarity cooperation mechanisms between rich and 
developing economies. One such solution could be 
debt cancellation or restructuring. The EU’s climate 
finance programmes can serve as a policy example 
for this aspect of the green recovery. 
Dickens’ Tale of Two Cities ends with a country in 
turmoil, during the French “Reign of Terror”. 
Similar crushing social defeat today can only be 
averted by audacious, optimistic thinking and 
policymaking. Now is the time for our leaders to act. 
Only then, citizens will, as Dickens put it, “hold a 
sanctuary in their hearts, and in the hearts of their 
descendants” for their leaders today. 
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